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VIRTUES AND THE LAWYER
JAMES W. PERKINS
I. INTRODUCTION
Can there be a virtuous lawyer? Our non-lawyer friends
gleefully answer that virtuous lawyer is an oxymoron.'
Dissatisfaction with American lawyers has spread both
within and without the profession. Distinguished observers from
within the profession maintain that the "wise-counselor" or
"lawyer-statesman" ideal to which lawyers formerly aspired has
been dislodged and that the moral quality of law as practiced has
deteriorated.!
Among the causes cited for our moral decline are increased
competition among lawyers for legal work,' increased firm size,
Of counsel, Palmer & Dodge LLP, Boston, Massachusetts. The author has
served as Chairman of the Section of Local Government Law of the American Bar
Association, President of the National Association of Bond Lawyers and Managing
Partner of Palmer & Dodge.
After more than four decades as a practicing lawyer, the author enrolled in the
Harvard Divinity School and received the degree of Master of Theological Studies in
June 1996. Through cross-registration at the Weston Jesuit School of Theology, the
author studied with Father James Keenan, whose restatement of the Four Cardinal
Virtues plays a prominent part in this essay. The author is especially indebted to
him for his teaching and for his illumination of the role of the virtues in our lives.
Daniel Coquillette, formei Dean of Boston College Law School, relates a perti-
nent reflection by W. C. Fields: "Fields once paused by a tombstone that read, 'Here
lies a lawyer and an honest man' and remarked, 'How did they get two bodies under
there?'" Daniel R. Coquillette, Professionalism: The Deep Theory, 72 N.C. L. REV.
1271, 1272 (1994).
' See id. at 1272-73 (observing that the legal profession is in crisis because those
in the profession have lost sight of the ultimate reasons for obeying rules).
See American Bar Association, Commission on Professionalism, "... In the
Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism,
112 F.R.D. 243, 260 (1986) [hereinafter ABA (1986)] (discussing how economic pres-
sures have lead to unprofessional behavior); Boston Bar Association, Committee on
Professionalism, Professionalism and the Legal Profession 7 (1992) [hereinafter
BBA]; MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 25 (1994) ("By the mid-
1980s, no firm could take the loyalty of its clients for granted. Business-getting law-
yers were once again at a premium....").
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early specialization,' increased mobility of both lawyers and cli-
ents,5 high overhead costs, 6 invalidation of minimum fee sched-
ules, rules against lawyer advertising and solicitation of clients,7
unrelenting pressure to record more billable hours,' and de-
creased opportunities for co-deliberation with clients as to what
would be best (and not merely "legal") for them to do." To these I
would add greater opportunities for large profits and greater
risks of financial failure. All these causes lead to, or express, a
preoccupation with financial return rather than with promoting
humanity or bettering the quality of one's life."°
Our critics suggest that the former "wise counselor" or
"lawyer-statesman" ideal has been replaced by new ideals of the
lawyer who sacrifices his personal life for his career" or of the
' See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 291 (1993) (finding that spe-
cialization has led to a shift in the relationship between law firms and their clients,
"and has created an environment in which the lawyer-statesman ideal is less likely
to survive"); GLENDON, supra note 3, at 29, 37.
5 See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 278 (noting that "just as there has been a loos-
ening of the external ties that bind the large firm to its clients, so too has there been
a similar loosening of the internal bonds that link the members of each firm to one
another"); ABA (1986), supra note 3, at 260 (finding that "(clorporations are staffing
internally to do work which they used to send to outside firms," and companies are
replacing long-time counsel with "firms that promise to do the same work for less
money"); GLENDON, supra note 3, at 25 (observing that in the 1980's "[tlhe era when
firms could assume that the steady stream of business from a stable roster of clients
would flow on forever was drawing to a close").
a See ABA (1986), supra note 3, at 260 (illustrating by example the enormous
pressure felt by many lawyers today to generate fees in order to cover overhead and
still earn an income).
7 See ABA (1986), supra note 3, at 255-57 (summarizing Supreme Court cases
on regulation of lawyers); BBA, supra note 3, at 7; Dick Dahl, The Trouble with
Lawyers, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 1996, at 28 (Magazine). Although invalidating
these rules played a part in commercializing the practice of law, invalidation was in
the public interest. It enabled the public to shop more effectively for legal services
on the basis of both quality and cost. See SOL M. LINOWITZ, THE BETRAYED
PROFESSION 147-48 (1994).
a See ABA (1986), supra note 3, at 260 (opining that attorneys are put under
pressure to bill more hours due to the high overhead costs of law firms); GLENDON,
supra note 3, at 29 (discussing how billing "bjy the 1980's ... had evolved from a
sensible tool of office management to a frenetic way of life"); KRONMAN, supra note
4, at 302 (noting that there is now an "increased emphasis on hours billed as a cri-
terion for measuring associate performance" and this has lead to "associates ...
themselves equat[ing] success ... with hours billed"); Dahl, supra note 7, at 27.
9 See GLENDON, supra note 3, at 34 (stating that this has arisen due to in-
creased specialization); KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 286-91.
'o See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 296, 299; Dahl, supra note 7, at 27.
" KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 307 (talking of "the lawyer who cares about noth-
ing but work and is prepared to sacrifice all of his or her personal energies to it"); cf.
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"lawyer-businessman" who brings major legal business into the
firm.12 An American Bar Association report on professionalism
asks, "Has our profession abandoned principle for profit, profes-
sionalism for commercialism?" 3 One federal judge, responding
to the business emphasis of law firms, put it this way:
For [the associate] to come to any conclusion other than the fact
that the dollar is what the practice of law is all about would re-
quire some sort of superhuman mental gyration on his part, be-
cause all of the stimuli to which he's being exposed indicate the
exact reverse. The buck is what it's about. 4
The critics are generally pessimistic in outlook and short on
suggestions for improvement. One critic, Dean Kronman of Yale,
in The Lost Lawyer, suggests that individuals "may find a way to
honor [the lawyer-statesman ideal] ... by searching out the
cracks and crevices in which a person devoted to [it] may still
make a living in the law."'"
My purpose here is to suggest a hopeful path: To move legal
ethics away from its nearly exclusive emphasis on rules to an
approach based more on virtues and character similar to the
"lawyer-statesman" or "wise counselor" ideal. This entails focus-
ing on the kind of person the lawyer is becoming through his
training and actions. What is needed is an explicit re-
articulation of virtue-oriented ethics as applied to the practice of
law today.
II. CHARACTER AND RULES
The two most significant camps of ethical theorists are deon-
tologists (after the Greek word for "ought")"6 and ontologists
(after the Greek word for "be"). Deontologists emphasize rules.
Ontologists emphasize character-the sort of persons we are, or
John Paul II, Laborem Exercens §6 (1981) ("However true it may be that man is
destined for work and called to it, in the first place work is 'for man' and not man
'for work.'), reprinted in CLAUDIA CARLEN IHM, THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1958 -
19811 at 299, 304 (1981).
See Gerald Gillerman, The American Lawyer: Voices from Another Quarter, 29
BOSTON B. J. 35, 38-39 (1985).
" ABA (1986), supra note 3, at 251.
14 Judge John F. Grady, Commentary, THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDE-
PENDENCE: AN IDEAL REVISITED 30 (John B. Davidson ed., 1985).
I KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 7.
"6 See James F. Keenan, S.J., Proposing Cardinal Virtues, 56 THEOLOGICAL
STUDIES 709 (1995).
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are becoming. A deontologist asks, "What is the law
[governing] my life?" An ontologist asks, "What is my goal, [my]
ideal?"'"
Rules tend to operate negatively. It is relatively easy to
make rules about what not to do. For example, one should not
steal from a beggar's cup when he advances it for a donation.
But a rule as to what should be done is more difficult to articu-
late. Should we give the beggar money? Will he use it wisely?
Should we instead give to the United Way, or to a shelter? If we
give, how much should we give? The best answer is too depend-
ent on circumstances to be encapsulated in a rule.
Since rules must be limited to what can be more-or-less suc-
cinctly stated, they tend to be minimalistic. They understate the
significance of the call to a moral life. Rules do not teach us how
to become the kind of person we ought to be, nor do rules bestow
on us the honesty and insight needed in order to determine what
ought to be done. Rules do not tug at our emotions to influence
us to be more fair and helpful to others, or to do what is right for
ourselves. As distinguished senior lawyer Sol Linowitz once put
it, "'Rules' may not be the answer: Attitudes will count for
' See id. at 710.H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF 60 (1963). Many deontologists
believe that the rules can be derived from primal self-evident principles, such as re-
spect for life and autonomy. However, virtue ethicists tend to believe that "virtues
can provide the standards of morally right conduct .... [Pirinciples and rules are de-
rived from virtues." Keenan, supra note 16, at 711; see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER
WITH MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 14 (1991)
(noting that "virtue and good character are goals in themselves"). There are some
ethicists with a foot in each camp who claim that virtues "do not supply specific di-
rectives for determining right or wrong conduct [but] merely enable us to perform
what the principles command.' Keenan, supra note 16, at 711; see ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 119 (2d ed. 1984) ("Qualities of character.. .generally
come to be prized only because they will lead us to follow the right set of rules.").
See generally WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 65 (2d ed. 1973) (proposing a dual mo-
rality, "for every principle there will be a morally good trait,...consisting of a dispo-
sition or tendency to act according to it; and for every morally good trait there will
be a principle defining the kind of action in which it is to express itself'). This article
presupposes (with the deontologists) that some rules can be drawn from self-evident
principles. For example, the general rule that we should not kill can be drawn from
the obvious principle of respect for life. But it can be drawn from the virtues as well
since a just person would not kill another person without compelling justification.
Virtues do what principles cannot do; they motivate. Moreover, as will be seen, the
virtue of prudence provides the only standards that can exist for choosing among
conflicting values that cannot be measured against one another, whether those val-
ues are found in "principles" or in "virtues."
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more."
19
Beyond compliance with rules, there is what ethicists call
supererogatory action.20 Supererogatory action is voluntary ac-
tion that goes beyond what the rules require in order to promote
good.2 It is both socially useful and life-enrichening to have a
category of meritorious actions that goes beyond what is re-
quired. Because rules concern that which is required only, they
do not promote supererogatory action. Character does.
The honesty and skill to discern what is right, and the desire
and goodness to do what is right, lie not in rules, but in the vir-
tues. The virtues are acquired character traits. For instance, by
regularly doing just acts, one becomes a just person.' Therefore,
justice-an attraction to fairness and a disposition to act justly-
is a key virtue. So, also, is prudence. Prudence is a skill and an
affinity for deliberating as to what is right, and respecting tradi-
tion and the opinions of others while, at the same time, thinking
for oneself without self-deception.
Rules are externally imposed and limit our freedom. Virtues
arise within us and express our freedom. This reinforces their
motivating power.
III. THE FORMER LAWYER VIRTUES
In A Nation Under Lawyers, Professor Mary Ann Glendon of
Harvard Law School has described the virtues of the "wise coun-
selor" as ideals to which "lawyers were so widely oriented ... in
the earlier part of this century."m The wise counselor had a
broad view of faithful client representation and functioned as the
conscience to his or her clients.2" The wise counselor served his
or her clients best by dissuading them from litigation, or by dis-
cussing options, rather than by blindly following the individual
19 LINOWITZ, supra note 7, at 36.
20 See Tom L. Beauchamp, What's So Special About the Virtues? in VIRTUE AND
MEDICINE 307, 311-12 (Earl E. Shelp ed., 1985).
2 See WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS, Works of Supereroga-
tion, John MacQuarrie 612 (James F. Childress & John MacQuarrie eds., 1986).
"See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. 11-11, 58, art.3 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 1948) [hereinafter AQUINAS, cited by part and
article number] (explaining that justice is a virtue and that "justice regulates hu-
man operations").
GLENDON, supra note 3, at 35.
See id. at 35, 75 (stating that such an ideal of the lawyer's role often overrode
personal and economic considerations).
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clients' wishes." These counselors recognized a distinct respon-
sibility to maintain "the integrity of the legal system."2  They
sought to enhance the administration of justice and "leave the
law a better instrument of justice than they found it.""7
Dean Kronman describes a similar ideal, that of the "lawyer-
statesman." This nineteenth century ideal was not confined to
lawyers prominent in public life. It also guided lawyers in pri-
vate practice." The help a lawyer-statesman offered to clients
was not merely a means to an end, for it also included guidance
about those ends."9 The lawyer-statesman was "distinguished by
the exceptional wisdom he display[ed] in this regard."0 He was
"a paragon of judgment, and others look[ed] to him for leadership
on account of his extraordinary deliberative power."' He had
personality traits that allowed him to sympathize with a broad
spectrum of conflicting viewpoints. 2 These were "qualities as
much of feeling as of thought."3
According to these critics, this "wise-counselor" or "lawyer-
statesman" ideal has been reduced to a narrower notion of
"zealous representation, rather than co-deliberation. "H In its
place, a profit-motivated entrepreneurial ideal has emerged.
IV. APPRAISAL
My own assessment of our moral condition is not as negative
as that of our sterner critics. It is mixed. There is much to be
discouraged about, but much to be proud of as well. My assess-
ment is based on the experience of a career principally, but not
exclusively, in bond law, the financing of state and local govern-
See id.26 Id. at 17 (quoting from a speech given by Karl Llewellyn at the University of
Chicago Law School in 1961).
27 Id. at 99.
28 See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 109.
" See id. at 288 ("It is this enterprise of codeliberation that the lawyer-
statesman ideal places at the center of the lawyer's professional life.").
"0 Id. at 15 (stating that the advice the lawyer gives the client about possibilities
open to the client is what distinguishes attorneys from other professionals).
a' Id.
92 See id. (stating that the lawyer-statesman was able to help clients to under-
stand better their own aspirations).
32 Id. at 16 (noting that the lawyer-statesman ideal "was an ennobling thought,
even for those who fell short").
34 GLENDON, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing how corporate clients only request
the assistance of a law firm when they are faced with a problem or transaction that
requires special skill or knowledge).
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ments and their agencies primarily through the issuance of
bonds. 35
In my opinion, when operating in areas governed by specific
rules where it is not difficult to determine objectively whether or
not there has been compliance, most lawyers act properly. For
instance, very few lawyers steal client funds."' Also, most law-
yers with whom I have worked have been well-prepared. They
have kept up with new developments by reading current publi-
cations or attending seminars. They have exercised due dili-
gence in particular transactions.
A few, however, when rendering legal opinions, have treated
legal requirements casually. Some lawyers, I believe, relied on
their belief that lack of compliance with legal requirements
would not be discovered or would not be raised in a legal pro-
ceeding. Others may have complied literally or facially with le-
gal requirements, but failed to recognize that the substance of
the transaction defeated the purposes of the legal requirements.
Some, when reviewing or preparing a prospectus, have made no
serious effort to see that investors were properly informed.
Some bond lawyers have teamed up with investment bank-
ers to promote complex novel transactions to public agencies that
were not yet clients. This, I believe, has led to situations where
the professionals have put their own financial interests ahead of
the potential client's best interest. Moreover, I have observed
that some bond lawyers (as well as lawyers in other fields) tend
to run up billable time needlessly or heedlessly when the legal
fees are based on time spent.37
" Bond practice involves the, structuring of transactions and sometimes the
creation of new public entities to finance projects and programs of state and local
governments. Governments typically finance these undertakings by the issuance of
bonds that are to be repaid from taxes or other revenues. Bond lawyers draft the
necessary proceedings and documents and render opinions regarding whether the
bonds are legally binding obligations, or whether the interest to be paid on them is
tax-exempt. Often bond lawyers prepare or review the prospectus that discloses to
investors the material facts bearing on the credit worthiness of the issuer.
" Thus, in the twelve months ended August 31, 1997, only "29 attorneys or .06%
of the attorneys licensed to practice law in Massachusetts were responsible for the
$2,348,443 in defalcations found by the Board." Massachusetts Clients' Security
Board, Report for Fiscal Year 1987, 1. One can assume that the same situation is
also true elsewhere.
17 See generally Sonia S. Chan, ABA Formal Opinion 93-379: Double Billing,
Padding and Other Forms of Overbilling, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 611 (1996)
(explaining the general problem of overbilling and the reasons why it is done); Wil-
liam G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 1
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Despite all of this, there are many examples of lawyers pos-
sessing a high moral purpose. Experienced lawyers in all fields
have been remarkably generous in their willingness to educate
their competition. Lawyers in all fields have devoted huge
amounts of time and attention to improving the law-making it
work better-by proposing revisions of statutes and regulations,
or by commenting constructively on proposals made by others.
There is a disquieting side to our efforts to influence legisla-
tion regarding our livelihood, however. We tend to use our. pro-
fessional organizations to oppose changes in the law that would
reduce the need for our services, whether or not these changes
would serve the public good. 8 We may honestly believe that the
changes would not be in the public's best interest, and that our
expert opinion should be heard, but we have an unavoidable
bias. It would be better for us not to argue the public interest
(other than as advocates for our clients) when our self-interest is
likely to defeat our objectivity.39
Lawyers in all fields have been generous in their support of
legal services to the poor. Bar associations, as well, have been
advocates of this assistance and have even organized entities to
provide these services. Lawyers and law firms contribute money
and personnel to these bar-sponsored entities and also provide
direct services to needy clients pro bono."' But the record has
been mixed. Pro bono is not part of the culture of some firms
and proposals for mandatory pro bono work have been met with
resistance."'
(1991) (discussing the ethical aspects of various types of time-based billing).
38 See generally Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Perform-
ances, 15 YALE L. & POLY REV. 193, 235-42 (1996) (recommending possible ways in
which bar associations can increase their effectiveness).
"' Consider, for example, the successful opposition of trial lawyers to the bill,
vetoed by President Clinton, that would have limited punitive damages in product
liability cases. See Neil A. Lewis, President Vetoes Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 1996, at Al (noting that consumer groups and trial lawyers were the primary
foes of the bill).
4 See LINOWITZ, supra note 7, at 202-06 (noting the practices of certain large
firms).
4" See Honorable JosephW. Bellacosa, Obligatory Pro Bono Publico Legal Serv-
ices: Mandatory or Voluntary? Distinction Without a Difference?, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 745, 754 (1991) (asserting that no matter how controversial a proposal for a
lawyer to perform mandatory pro bono work appears to be, lawyers have an obliga-
tion to engage in pro bono ventures); Victor Marrero, Committee to Improve the
Availability of Legal Services, Final Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New
York, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 756 (1991) (describing a committee report on the
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Unquestionably, many lawyers have become preoccupied
with the prospect of monetary gain, not only to finance a stan-
dard of living to which they aspire but as a measure of their pro-
fessional success, a major factor in their self-esteem. To these
ends, lawyers are working longer hours yet enjoying work less.42
For many lawyers, too much of their workday consists of activi-
ties they did not bargain for when they chose to become law-
yers."3  Many lawyers are "miserable." In turn, family life
suffers.
Interpersonal relations are not what they ought to be in
many law firms. The lawyers do not pull together to assist one
another, but compete to achieve greater compensation or rank.
Major firms have sometimes broken up because of the inability of
partners to "divide the pie" amicably."5
Too often, non-lawyer staff are seen as mere instruments
and not as persons having their own goals or as allies in a com-
mon enterprise. When Lawyer A asks Lawyer B how many
"people" are in his or her firm, both lawyers usually understand
that "people" means "lawyers" rather than all the members of
the working team. Nevertheless, respect for non-lawyer co-
workers has improved over the last generation." This has hap-
pened, in part, through necessity-because non-lawyer co-
workers can go elsewhere and know it-but also, in part, because
of enhanced sensitivity and awareness.
Lawyers have also had a problem with respect for clients as
availability of legal services in which it was recommended that all members of the
New York bar should perform a minimum of forty hours of pro bono service for the
poor every two years).
42 See SHAFFER, supra note 18, at 153-54.
For example, most did not aspire to become marketers.
"See GLENDON, supra note 3, at 84; Dahl, supra note 7, at 26; see also LI-
NOWITZ, supra note 7, at 242.
45 See Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPS, Law
Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1786 (1990)
(suggesting formulas for determining how partners in law firms should be paid);
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37
STAN. L. REV. 313, 320-22 (1985) (discussing various theories of profit sharing in law
firms).
4 See, e.g., Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Moral-
ity", 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (suggesting lawyers should treat others, includ-
ing support personnel, with respect) (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION
OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE'ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP) (1992)).
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persons. In the past, many lawyers regarded clients as a neces-
sary evil, as mere means towards the goal of earning a living or
displaying their craftsmanship. In this respect, increased com-
petition for legal work and increased mobility of clients have had
a salutary effect. Clients can demand respect as well as service
and, if they have not received both, can go elsewhere.
In short, most of us have tended to comply with rules but we
have not done as well as we should have to seek a higher and
wider level of excellence in our professional lives. Let us now
look briefly at recent efforts of the organized bar to raise and
broaden our sights beyond rules.
V. THE ABA AND "PROFESSIONALISM"
In 1984, the American Bar Association ("ABA") made an ex-
pansive move by establishing the Commission on Professional-
ism. In its 1986 report, the commission urged all segments of
the Bar to:
1. Preserve and develop within the profession integrity, compe-
tence,
fairness, independence, courage and a devotion to the public
interest.
2. Resolve to abide by higher standards of conduct than the
minimum required by the [1969] Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility and the [19831 Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
3. Increase the participation of lawyers in pro bono activities
and help lawyers recognize their obligation to participate.
4. Resist the temptation to make the acquisition of wealth a
primary goal of law practice.
5. Encourage innovative methods which simplify and make less
47expensive the rendering of legal services.
In addition, the commission asked lawyers to "put aside self-
interest" when supporting or opposing legislation, unless doing
so on behalf of clients. 8
47ABA (1986), supra note 3, at 265.
" Id. at 264, 281. The Commission added:
Parochial and shortsighted efforts to garner additional income for lawyers
generally, or groups of lawyers, through special interest legislation, can
only decrease public esteem.... I]t is hard to justify how legislation aimed
at simplifying the handling of uncontested matters - clearly in the public
interest and aimed at holding down fees - should ever properly be opposed
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The commission urged "creative teaching of ethics and pro-
fessionalism" in law schools by the Socratic method," and in the
continuing education of those already in practice. ° It proposed
that "discussion not be limited to the lowest level of conduct in
which a lawyer may engage without being professionally disci-
plined," for "the true professional will usually demand more of
himself or herself."51
The commission called on bar associations to develop
"alternative dispute resolution mechanisms" so as to avoid the
"cost, delay and uncertainty associated with civil litigation."" In
doing so, it reiterated remarks made by former Chief Justice
Burger: "The true function of our profession should be to gain an
acceptable result in the shortest possible time with the least
amount of stress and at the lowest possible cost to the client. To
accomplish that is the true role of the advocate."53
In response to the commission's report, a number of law
schools have incorporated the recommendations into their legal
ethics curriculum.4 Numerous state and local bar associations
have followed the ABA's initiative and published professionalism
"codes" and "reports."55 These efforts by the organized bar, at-
by groups of lawyers.
Id. at 282.
'9 Id. at 266-68.
'0 See id. at 274-75.
"1 Id. at 267. Professor Shaffer of Notre Dame derides the idea of
"professionalism" and the ABA's effort to promote it. Shaffer views professionalism
as inescapably elitist and impersonal, see SHAFFER, supra note 18, at 66-71, and
even idolatrous in its "claim that only those who are admitted to the profession's
mysteries can judge those who practice them." Id at 71. However, these objections
can be viewed as overblown, and I maintain that a professionalism conscientiously
grounded in virtue ethics could overcome the wrong kind of elitism. People of all
backgrounds and social classes can cultivate virtues, not just "the affluent and those
of high status," as in Aristotle's view. MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 159. Virtue
ethics is elitist, but it is an elitism based on excellence, not privilege. On the other
hand, I share Professor Shaffer's view that non-lawyers ought to be invited to par-
ticipate in making and enforcing rules that govern lawyers. Cf. LINOWITZ, supra
note 7, at 140 (recognizing that self-regulation has been "one of the hallmarks of
professional status"); see also ABA (1986), supra note 3, at 261. For an especially
strong statement of this view, see JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 218-20
(1978).
'2 ABA (1986), supra note 3, at 288.
*' Id. at 290.
See Justin A. Stanley, Professionalism and Commercialism, 50 MONT. L. REV.
1, 11 (1989) (citing, as examples, Cornell University and University of Pennsylva-
nia).
. These are on file at the offices of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibil-
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tempting to elevate the standards of the legal profession beyond
that which is minimally acceptable, offer encouragement as to
the future moral health of the bar. But in spite of these efforts,
the scope of these codes and reports has been mixed, often falling
short of the moral demands made in the ABA report. For exam-
ple, a 1992 report of the Boston Bar Association saw our moral
malaise as largely a matter of incivility.56 However, their 1997
report attacked the issue of professional fulfillment across the
board and suggested specific steps to be taken by lawyers, law
firms, corporate and governmental law departments, and law
schools to rectify the situation.67 The 1997 report did not, how-
ever, address the underlying issue of personal character and
character development. A report of the Massachusetts Bar As-
sociation likewise touched many bases but failed to give any real
emphasis to our preoccupation with profit or our tendency to re-
sist, rather than promote, measures that would simplify legal
requirements and reduce legal costs.5"
Lawyers need to give more attention to their goals and to the
virtues required to make the appropriate moral choices to pursue
them. The ABA's professionalism project offers constructive ex-
hortations but provides no basis in anthropology, psychology, or
spirituality that might lead a lawyer to be moved by them. I
propose a grounding in goal-oriented virtue ethics, a system of
moral thought having a long pedigree beginning with Aristotle's
remarkable insights. I will, accordingly, now turn to the issue of
goals and the virtues that would enable us to pursue them.
VI. VIRTUE ETHICS: GOALS AND VIRTUES
Human beings have goals, or ends."9 The Greek word for a
goal or end is telos. ° So an ethic that is oriented to goals or ends
is "teleological." Virtue ethics is teleological.6'
ity, 541 North Fairbanks Court, 14th floor, Chicago, Illinois 60611-3314.
' See BBA, supra note 3, at 4.
6 See Boston Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on Professional Fulfill-
ment (1997).
MASSACHUSETTS BAR ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT ON LAWYER PROFES-
SIONALISM (1989).
" See AQUINAS, supra note 22, at pt. I-II, art. 1-1.
6o See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 315 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962)
[hereinafter ARISTOTLE, cited by book and chapter number).
61 Joseph J. Kotva, Jr., An Appeal for a Christian Virtue Ethic, 67 THOUGHT 158,
161 (1992).
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Most goals are intermediate. That is, in addition to being
goals in and of themselves, they are means to other goals. For
example, getting to the office on time is a goal, but it is also a
means toward the goals of earning a living, serving the client,
and advancing the aims of the legal system. These, in turn, are
means to other goals. When you follow the chain of goals all the
way, you come to a person's ultimate or final telos.6 2 For Aris-
totle, the final goal was eudaimonia, which is usually translated
to mean "happiness."" Aristotle regarded this as "the same as
'living well' and 'doing well.' "' It was "some sort of pleasure,"
since "the happy life [was] a pleasant life."" But it was not syn-
onymous with pleasure since many pleasures, such as those of
the body, are not ends in themselves but are merely means to
happiness and can be pursued to an excess."
Eudaimonia may also be understood as "the state of being
well and doing well in being well,"' or as "becoming excellent
human beings."6" Thomas Aquinas, the great medieval systema-
tist of Christian theology, described a two-part moral-ethical sys-
tem. One part was theological and specifically Christian. Its
final telos was the happiness that is realized in being united with
God. 69 Christian faith was an essential ingredient to achieving
this goal. 0
The other part, derived largely from Aristotle, was "natural,"
secular and essentially philosophical.71 This system was more-
or-less sufficient for the affairs of this world.72 It was imperfect;
however, because for Aquinas, salvation could be achieved only
02 See AQUINAS, supra note 22, at pt. I-II, 1, arts. 4-5.
3 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 60, at bk. 1, ch. 7; see also MACINTYRE, supra note
18, at 148.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 60, at bk. 1, ch. 4.
Id. at bk. 7, ch. 13.
See id. at bk. 7, ch. 12-14; cf AQUINAS, supra note 22, at pt. I-I, 2, art. 6
(explaining Aquinas' view on whether man's happiness exists in pleasure).
67M ACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 148; see also GILBERT C. MEILAENDER, THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VIRTUE 11 (1984) (stating that virtues are needed in order
"to live a life characteristic of flourishing human beings").
" Kotva, supra note 61, at 161.
See AQUINAS, supra note'22, at pt. I-II, 3, art. 2.
o See id. at pt. I-I1, 19, art. 5.
7' The secular system did call for the worship of God. See AQUINAS, supra note
22, at pt. 11-I1, 81, art. 2. But this worship was not specifically Christian since, in
Aquinas' opinion, it was a "dictate of natural reason." Id. Aquinas held that the exis-
tence of God could be demonstrated by reason alone. See id. at pt. I, 2, art. 2-3.
n See id. at pt. I-I, 63, art. 2.
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within the theological system. This meant that only through the
God-given "theological" virtues of faith, hope, and charity could
one achieve salvation."
My purpose here is to find a way to advance legal ethics in
this pluralistic, yet somewhat religious, society so that our legal
careers can be more fulfilling. For now, I will limit my discus-
sion to the natural and philosophical considerations and post-
pone the theological and supernatural considerations until the
end.
Virtues are the excellencies that lead us toward the ultimate
telos. Vices impede this journey. Virtues are skills.74 Virtues
are also traits of character.75 They are habits or dispositions. 6
Virtues not only allow us to act in particular ways, "but also to
feel in particular ways."" Virtues not only empower us to do the
right thing, they are essential to the determination of what is
right. 8 Virtues and vices do not lead inexorably to rightful or
wrongful action because in varying degrees, we are free to act
contrary to our settled dispositions. 9 But virtues make rightful
actions far more likely, as vices make wrongful actions more
likely. "To act virtuously ... is to act from inclination formed by
the cultivation of the virtues." ° We cultivate the virtues by
practice, especially in imitation of others who are virtuous, as
"' See id. at pt. I-I, 5, art. 5; pt. I-I, 51, art. 4; pt. 1-11, 58, art. 3; pt. 1-II, 61, art.
1; pt. I-I1, 63, art. 1; pt. I-I, 109, art. 4-5; pt. II-I, 24, art. 2-3.
74 See MEILAENDER, supra note 67, at 7, 9-10 (discussing the possibility that vir-
tue is equal to skill). In addition, the author considers whether ones disposition to
act a certain way or to have a particular character trait is equivalent to one's virtue.
See id. at 7-11.
75 See FRANKENA, supra note 18, at 63 ("Virtues are dispositions or traits that
are not wholly innate; they must all be acquired, at least in part, by teaching and
.practice, or perhaps, by grace."); cf KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 76 (discussing what
factors are considered in determining what qualifies as traits of character);
MEILAENDER, supra note 67, at 9-10.
76 See FRANKENA, supra note 18, at 62-63; MEILAENDER, supra note 67, at 7-8.
n MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 149; cf. FRANKENA, supra note 18, at 63
(stating that virtues involve more than just tendencies to feel a certain way but in-
clude tendencies to act a certain way, as well).
78 See Kotva, supra note 61, at 167.
"' See MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 168 ("Character ..., the arena of the virtues
and vices, simply becomes one more circumstance, external to will."); see also JAMES
M. GUSTAFSON, CAN ETHICS BE CHRISTIAN?. 41-42 (1975) (discussing how virtues
arise out of habits); LEE H. YEARLEY, MENCIUS AND AQUINAS 107 (1990) (noting that
"[dlistinctively human dispositions rely on natural and acquired capabilities, but
they also involve choice").
80 MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 149.
VIRTUES AND THE LAWYER
well as by education and training.8
VII. VIRTUE ETHICS: CARDINAL VIRTUES
To understand the virtues better, we divide them into key or
"cardinal" (literally "hinge") virtues. Although Aquinas based
his secular system on Aristotle, he borrowed his cardinal virtues
from Plato.2 The cardinal virtues were prudence (or "practical
reason"), justice (directed to others), and temperance and forti-
tude (directed to ourselves).' These virtues became the
"classical" virtues of Catholic moral teaching, yet they remained
secular and philosophical in nature. Also, these virtues were
"natural" since humans could acquire them naturally, unlike the
"theological" virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which were in-
fused into the faithful by God's grace. Aquinas saw all other
natural virtues, such as generosity and patience, as subsumed
within one or more of the cardinal virtues."
A major problem with Aquinas' list is that he saw the vir-
tues as essentially one. They were present, or absent, together.'
You could not be brave, just, and temperate unless you were
prudent, and vice versa." You could not truly be brave without
being just. 7 Aquinas did not see any conflicts among the virtues,
but there are conflicts: conflicts among what we owe to others,
what we owe to those with whom we have a special bond, and
81 See AQUINAS, supra note 22, at pt. I-I, 51, art. 3; ARISTOTLE, supra note 60,
bk. 2, ch. 1 ("Thus, the virtues are implanted in us neither by nature nor contrary to
nature: we are by nature equipped with the ability to receive them, and habit brings
this ability to completion and fulfillment."); FRANKENA, supra note 18, at 63
(explaining virtues must be acquired through practice and teachings); Kotva, supra
note 61, at 160 n. 1, 163, 172 (discussing how some learn virtue through imitation).
82 See generally JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES (Richard Winston
et al. trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press ed. 1966).
8 See AQUINAS, supra note 22, at pt. I-Il, 61, art. 2-3 (discussing the principal
virtues).
See id. at pt. I-I, 61, art, 2 (concluding that all other virtues are reducible to
the four principal virtues).
M See MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 155, 157.
s See MEILAENDER, supra note 67, at 25-26 (explaining the relationship be-
tween prudence and the other three virtues); PIEPER, supra note 82, at 3, 32, 123
(stating prudence's preeminence over the other virtues). "No moral virtue is possible
without prudence." Id. at 32 (quoting THOMAS AQUINAS, QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE
DE VERITATAE, 14, 6).
87 See PIEPER, supra note 82, at 125 (referring to "just cause"). For Aristotle
also, "the virtues [could not] exist independently of one another :... [Als soon as [a
man) possesses this single virtue of practical wisdom [i.e. prudence), he will also
possess all the rest." ARISTOTLE, supra note 60, bk. 6, ch. 13.
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what we owe to ourselves."
Our notions of justice do not fit well within our special bond
relationships (such as marriage or friendship), or our relations
with ourselves, for justice is even-handed. Justice cannot per-
fectly accommodate all we owe our families, friends, and our-
selves insofar as it differs from what we owe to others. 89
To focus on the potential of the virtues in the life of a lawyer
today, we do better when we use contemporary classifications. I
will use classifications proposed by Father James Keenan of the
Western Jesuit School of Theology in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
In his ground-breaking article, Proposing Cardinal Virtues, Fa-
ther Keenan lists prudence, justice, fidelity and self-care. ®
In Father Keenan's scheme, a settled disposition of justice
draws one to fairness; namely, to whatever may be generally due
to others.9' Fidelity draws us to meet our obligations to those
with whom we have special bonds, such as friends, family and
colleagues. A disposition to self-care draws us to meet our obli-
gations to ourselves.
Prudence "discerns and sets the standards of moral action." '
It involves a three-step operation: deliberation, judgment, and
decision. 3 The decision governs the emotions, including the of-
ten conflicting emotional pulls of justice, fidelity, and self-care.
It governs them not dictatorially, but "politically," in other
words, with their assent. '  If the other virtues are well-
developed, the emotions have a disposition to assent to the di-
rection that prudence gives.5
See Keenan, supra note 16, at 721-22.Aristotle recognized that "[wihat is just is not the same for parents with re-
gard to their children and for brothers with regard to one another, nor is it the same
for bosom companions as for fellow citizens." ARISTOTLE, supra note 60, bk. 8, ch. 9.
However, lie did not recognize conflicts among these obligations. What was due to
each was different, but it was simply a matter of degree. See id. at bk. 9, ch. 2.
"[The element of justice increases with (the closeness of) the [relationship]." Id. at
bk. 8, ch. 9. He recognized no obligation of justice to ourselves at all, but only an ob-
ligation to the state not to take our own lives. See id. at bk. 5, ch. 11.
90 See Keenan, supra note 16, at 723-28.
" See id. at 724 (analyzing the virtue of justice). Cf. AQUINAS, supra note 22, at
pt. I-I1, 58, art. 1 (discussing the definition of justice).
Keenan, supra note 16, at 718.
"See PIEPER, supra note 82, at 12, 162.
See AQUINAS, supra note 22, at pt. I-I, 56, art. 4.
Cf. id. at pt. I-I, 56, art. 4. Kronman calls this concept "self-rule." KRONMAN,
supra note 4, at 37-47. Jane Austen calls it "self-command":
[Emma] 'You are comfortable because you are under command.'
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The four virtues fit remarkably well with the needs of the
legal profession.
A. Justice
If a lawyer dwells on justice and develops the virtue of jus-
tice, she will seek to make the legal system work more effectively
and in a less costly manner. She will be drawn to support law
reform, rather than resist it. She will offer her services pro bono
to individuals or organizations that cannot afford market rates.
She will pass along her expertise to others through teaching at
professional seminars. As a litigator, she will represent her cli-
ents faithfully, but she will not distort or abuse the adversarial
system by using delaying tactics, obfuscation, or causing her ad-
versary to spend unnecessarily.
B. Fidelity
If a lawyer dwells on the virtue of fidelity and practices it,
she will bear in mind, in all her decisions, the needs of friends,
family, and colleagues. She will reconcile their needs for sup-
port, affection, and respect with the obligation of service to the
client.
C. Self-Care
If a lawyer dwells on the virtue of self-care, and trains her-
self in it, she will not let her own longing for full flourishing
wither. She will not allow herself to become preoccupied with
profit at the expense of service or at the expense of broader per-
sonal development, nor will she become chronically saddened by
what Dean Kronman calls "lost loves and abandoned dreams."
D. Conflicts of the Cardinal Virtues
Contrary to Aquinas' scheme, these proposed virtues are not
unified. They are in conflict. The obligations of fidelity to family
(Frank] Tour command?-Yes.'
(Emma] 'Perhaps I intended you to say so, but I meant self-command. You
had, somehow or other, broken bounds yesterday, and run away from your
own management; but today you are got back again-and as I cannot be
always with you, it is best to believe your temper under your own com-
mand rather than mine.'
JANE AUSTEN, EMMA 324 (E.P. Dutton 1934) (1816).
"KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 86.
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and friends constantly conflict with the essential obligation of a
lawyer to advance justice. Self-care, including the pursuit of the
dream of serving the public interest rather than Mammon, can
often conflict with the demands of fidelity to provide for one's
family. Furthermore, a virtue can conflict with itself. For ex-
ample, the needs of clients, colleagues, and family-all served by
fidelity--can easily conflict with one another.
These conflicts can be especially difficult to resolve because
conflicting needs are usually "incommensurable." For example,
the decision of whether to go home and have dinner with one's
spouse and children, versus staying at the office to meet a
pressing deadline, cannot simply be made by putting points on
each need and choosing between them on the basis of the points
assigned. You cannot calculate your choice by any known branch
of mathematics or deduce it from self-evident first principles by
any known branch of logic. What you must do is exercise judg-
ment. Judgment is central in the high art of prudence, to which
I now turn.
E. Prudence
We know that prudence deliberates, decides, and directs
moral action. It is not difficult to understand, then, how pru-
dence might operate when pursuing a goal that is not in conflict
with other goals. This is simply a question of means.' The more
difficult task is to choose between goals whose "goods" are in-
commensurable, where calculation or deduction will not suffice
and "any decision that is made must appear groundless."98 As
Alasdair MacIntyre puts it, "conflict between rival values cannot
be rationally settled. Instead one must simply choose."" Father
Keenan's cardinal virtues highlight these conflicts since, as we
have seen, self-care, fidelity, and the pursuit of justice for others
are often at war with one another.
Dean Kronman offers insight as to how prudence can func-
tion in the choice among incommensurable goods. Prudence is
9' See id. at 55 (emphasizing that this "calls for a judgment of a calculative kind.
Clearly, then, the skill most needed ... will be the ability to count costs with accu-
racy and speed.").
oa Id. at 59, 65.
MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 26. Because of the incommensurability of val-
ues, or "goods," the utilitarian criterion of choosing "the greatest happiness of the
greatest number" fails. It cannot be determined. It is "a pseudo-concept." Id. at 64.
It is "irrational." JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 112 (1980).
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both sympathetic and detached. In personal choice, prudence
provisionally adopts each of the alternative choices and sympa-
thetically examines how it would feel to be the kind of person one
may become by making that choice. But at the same time, pru-
dence remains detached by withholding final assent to any one
choice while it compares the kinds of persons which the choices
would lead one to become. With the benefit of that illumination,
prudence then makes the choice."®
Prudence acts wisely if it can look back with sympathy and
detachment at paths taken or not taken with an "integrity ...
that comes from being a friend to oneself,""0 ' rather than with
"regret or self-deception.""° In this integrity, "one's present at-
tachments are not at war with past ones." 3 In this wholeness,
Kronman locates the elusive criterion of wise choice that neither
calculation nor deduction can offer.'O Prudence itself provides
the criterion.0 5
Hence these virtues-justice, fidelity, self-care and pru-
dence-are what a lawyer needs to make moral choices.
Thus far we have been looking at the lawyer as an individ-
ual. Let us now consider the lawyer as a member of a firm.
VIII. THE FIRM
Lawyers belong to many communities; their families (both
nuclear and extended), their countries, states, towns, and their
social and religious groups. The working team to which a lawyer
belongs is another community, whether it is a law firm, a legal
aid office, or a corporate or governmental law department. I will
call it "the firm," whatever its precise status.
10 See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 66-74.
101 Id. at 84.
102 Id. at 85 (discussing the spectre of regret).
' Id. at 95 (noting that political fraternity is similar to this personal whole-
ness).
to4 See id. at 87, 97. In political decisions, which includes lawmaking, Kronman
finds a criterion of political fraternity that is comparable to integrity or wholeness of
a person in personal decision-making. Where the political community must choose
between conflicting incommensurable "goods," the resolution that best promotes
"political fraternity" is the wisest choice. Id. at 97. Thus, in the larger world, as well
as in personal affairs, this criterion or standard emerges from the operation of pru-
dence itself.
"0 See DANIEL MARK NELSON, THE PRIORITY OF PRUDENCE 34 (1992) (discussing
the prudential judgments made by a virtuous lawyer); PIEPER, supra note 82, at 27
(stating that prudence is the criterion for making ethical decisions).
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The firm is not merely messengers, secretaries, lawyers, and
administrators pursuing their individual goals separately. It is a
team doing together what cannot be done alone. There is an en-
tity, in addition to the people in it, that is greater than, and dif-
ferent from, the sum of its parts.
This creates new relationships among the members of the
team, and between the members and the firm. Obligations of fi-
delity bind team members to one another and to the firm. Obli-
gations of justice bind the firm to the public, and obligations of
fidelity bind the firm to its clients. All members of the team
participate in, and share, the obligations of the firm to its clients
and to the public.
Lawyers who dwell on the virtue of fidelity to co-workers,
and seek to develop that virtue within themselves, will no longer
see their non-lawyer co-workers as mere instruments to be used.
Rather, they will view them as persons to be respected, who have
their own personal goals along with the shared goal of excellence
of service by the firm. Lawyers who train themselves, by
thought and action, in their fidelity to the firm and in their sense
of shared obligation to its clients and the public, will enhance the
performance of the firm and, by their greater loyalty, enhance its
stability as well.
We will turn now to the lawyer as a member of a profession.
IX. THE PROFESSION
Beyond the firm, the profession is another community that,
like an individual, has a moral life and a character made up of
virtues and vices that lead to actions for good or ill. In a sense,
its character and its actions are merely the sum or composite of
the character and actions of the members. However, it also in-
teracts with its members and with the public in ways that are
best understood if it is viewed separately from its members.
Members of a common profession are related to one another
and to the profession. Among the virtues of the members, there-
fore, will be care for the well-being of the profession and care for
the quality of its service to the public. Additionally, the virtues
of spirit of comradeship, mutual encouragement and support fos-
ter one's own excellence, as well as the excellence of colleagues,
in service to the public.
Because it is a common calling, each member of the profes-
sion bears a common responsibility for how well the profession
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serves the public. It is not enough to say, "I did not generate a
transaction unnecessarily for my own benefit rather than the cli-
ent's even though others appear to have done so," or "I did not
abuse the discovery process in order to wear down the opposi-
tion, although others have done so." Lawyers share a common
responsibility to strive, through bar activities or other appropri-
ate means, to enhance the quality of service of the entire bar,
and to support processes and standards that will avoid abuses of
the law.
Let us pass now to the integration of the lawyer's many
roles, both personal and professional.
X. INTEGRITY
As we have seen, Dean Kronman finds integrity, in the
sense of personal wholeness, when he observes that prudence in-
volves being able to look back at past decisions without disinte-
grating conflict and regret."°
Integrity in the sense of wholeness also pertains to a moral
life in other ways. A person of good character has virtues that
lead him to act with substantial consistency in ways that express
those virtues. Such a person has "moral integrity" or
"wholeness."'07 This wholeness or consistency operates not only
from one occasion to another, but also from one area of life to an-
other. One cannot be one kind of person in family life and an-
other kind of person in business or professional life. One cannot
be one kind of person in church or temple or mosque and another
kind of person at the office. If one is not a truth-teller when
dealing with clients or opposing counsel, it will be all the more
difficult to be a truth-teller when dealing with others. If a law-
yer pursues shallow goals of greed or rank at the office, some of
that may have its effects at home and impress the lawyer's chil-
dren with faulty values. If a lawyer profits through abuse of the
law, she will not find harmony or wholeness of person by giving a
generous share of that profit to her church, law school, or a legal
services agency."
'0 See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 87, 95.
'07 GUSTAFSON, supra note 79, at 26-27.
'08 Dean Coquillette says this forcefully:
It is a delusion ... to think that (lawyers] can separate their personal from
their professional lives and their personal from their professional morality.
The current jargon refers to this dichotomy as "role defined" ethics. It is
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Integrity is not a fifth cardinal virtue, but it reflects the
consistent presence of the four cardinal virtues in the human
person."° The lawyer who seeks to develop and practice the vir-
tues in one area of life, but not in all, will fail. Any project of
moral regeneration through the pursuit of the virtues must be
across the board. A virtue is not a virtue unless it contributes to
a "whole human life in which the goods of [the parts] are inte-
grated into an overall pattern of goals which provides an answer
to the question: 'What is the best kind of life for a human being
like me to lead?"'10
XI. LEGAL EDUCATION
Should the virtues be taught in law school? Some will say
that it is too late; that virtues must be taught in the home, or in
grade school. But our common experience tells us that this has
not occurred with proper regularity or sufficiency. For many law
students, if it does not occur in law school, it does not occur at
all. I am still only a learner of the virtues. It is never too late."'
"[Piroblems, puzzles, quandaries or ... 'ethical dilemmas' "112
are the stuff of law school courses in legal ethics. "3 These
courses deal largely with the application of ethical rules to par-
true intellectual rubbish.... You cannot be a bad person and a good lawyer,
nor can you be a good person and a lawyer with sharp practices.
... [Integrity] means "wholeness" or "oneness." There is just one of each
of us.
Coquillette, supra note 1, at 1272.
But MacIntyre evidently regards wholeness, or integrity, as a distinct virtue:
"[Tihere is at least one virtue ... which cannot be specified at all except with refer-
ence to the wholeness of a human life-the virtue of integrity or constancy."
MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 203. MacIntyre stresses "the place of integrity and
constancy in ... the kind of life which is a quest for the good." Id. at 219.
"0 Id. at 275.
1' Shaffer emphatically disagrees that "a twenty-two-year-old in a university
law school is too old to learn morals." SHAFFER, supra note 18, at 84.
" Id. at 16.
"" The principal textbook (really a casebook) is ANDREW L. KAUFMAN,
PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (3d ed. 1989). The book is largely de-
voted to presentation of ninety-eight "problems" for discussion. Conflicts of interest
is the largest single category in the book; they are also the most common ethical
problem, by far, in law firms.
Although the book is excellent for its purpose, its purpose should be understood
as helping to resolve quandaries in applying the rules of ethics. It sets the problems
in contexts of such conflict and difficulty as to stretch students' moral vision as well
as their intellectual acuity. However, the book does not discuss the issues on which
we are most deficient, such as the lack of focus on true goals, the conflicting needs of
family and law practice, or the preoccupation with financial gain.
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ticular cases. This is essential training, of course, just as the
case method is essential when learning tort and contract princi-
ples. Resolution of these ethical dilemmas, however, is not the
most difficult issue. Most lawyers will act responsibly when ap-
plying specific ethical rules to concrete situations. Where they
fall down is in their preoccupation with profit; their distortion
and abuse of the litigation process; their resistance to law re-
form; their time away from their spouse and children; and their
denial of broader, fuller lives to themselves. These are not ethi-
cal dilemmas of the sort that yield to the casuistry of the case
method of instruction.
Others have suggested that the virtues be taught through
the use of moral exemplars." 4 This should be approached with
caution. For reasons that Professor Shaffer has identified in his
scathing critique of the "gentleman's ethic" of the nineteenth
century lawyers, the former "lawyer-statesman" or "wise-
counselor" ideal may turn out, on further examination, to be
more tarnished than we now realize." 5
What is needed is found much deeper in human value-
choices and motivations than case-studies of ethical dilemmas
can reach. My view, accordingly, is that legal education should
include exposure to the principal competing ethical systems, in-
cluding explicit attention to virtue ethics and how these systems
bear upon our becoming better lawyers and persons.1 " As the
law student examines these competing systems with the sympa-
thy and detachment that Dean Kronman sees as essential in
personal choice, the law student will become a better person.
Unlike the teaching of history or mathematics, the study of eth-
ics cannot be regarded as successful just because facts and theo-
ries and methods have passed into the mind of the student. The
student who has not become a more ethical person by the study
114 See, e.g., MEILAENDER, supra note 67, at 70-72 (discussing the importance of
learning the virtues by observing others).
"5 According to Shaffer: "[The gentleman's ethic] gave us slavery, Manifest
Destiny, the theft of half of Mexico, gunboat diplomacy, the subjugation of women,
the exploitation of immigrant children, Pinkerton detectives, yellow-dog contracts,
and the genocide of American Indians." SHAFFER, supra note 18, at 50. It was
"patriarchal, ... sexist ... [and] oppressive." Id. at 51.
116 Dean Coquillette's new coursebook is a major step in this direction. See
DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, LAWYERS AND FUNDAMENTAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1995). It leads the student to reflect how various ideas of ethics may help with
problems of moral choice that she will face as a lawyer. But it does not explicitly
bring forth contemporary thought in virtue ethics.
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of ethics has failed.
We must not, however, place excessive reliance on legal edu-
cation to overcome our professional crisis. As Dean Coquillette
has warned us, "our identity crisis as a profession ... cannot be
solved by required ethics courses or media consultants. It re-
quires a major reexamination of what we, as lawyers, are doing
with our lives every day."'
17
CONCLUSION AND CODA
Vigorous enforcement of court-adopted rules of legal ethics
will not suffice to overcome the moral malaise of our profession.
Only a relative handful of lawyers violate clear enforceable rules.
Our malaise is wider and deeper than that. It expresses itself in
preference for profit over justice; in workaholism at the expense
of family life and personal growth; in bitter competition for
money and rank at the expense of fraternity. What is needed is
closer attention to our true goals and to the excellencies or vir-
tues needed to pursue them.
Virtue ethics offers a system of ethical thought that is
promising, though imperfect, for today's legal profession. Simi-
larly, Aquinas found his system of "natural" virtues to be more-
or-less sufficient, though equally imperfect, for the affairs of the
medieval world. Virtue ethics can work equally well for people
with or without religious affiliations. Both sides can engage in
constructive dialogue as to what virtue ethics asks of us.
Our experience tells us that people without faith can be as
virtuous as religious adherents, even more so."" Nevertheless, I
believe that people with religious attachments have a higher call,
a call to something more than rough sufficiency, though we can
never fulfill the demands of this higher call. For those of us, like
me, who call ourselves Christians, the higher call is Jesus' call to
discipleship. He summons us to follow Him, to imitate Him, to
let God's "will be done."11 We are called to become the "sort of
persons [we] ought ... to be."W20
In our professional lives, this means regarding our work "as
an assignment from God with a sublime purpose. "121 In both
17 Coquillette, supra note 1, at 1276.See GUSTAFSON, supra note 79, at 80.
"' Matthew 6:10.
120 2 Peter 3:11.
" John XXIII, Mater et Magistra § 149 (1961), reprinted in JOSEPH GREMIL-
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Jewish and Christian thought, "'humans are cocreators ... in the
work of the world.' ,12 Jewish tradition calls upon humanity to
"imitate the ways of the Holy One"'2 by continuing God's work
and being "God's partner [by] picking up where God left off ...
[oln the seventh day." " Similarly, for John Paul II, "the working
person is a collaborator in creation and one who carries out God's
plan. 125
But our work cannot stand apart from the rest of our lives.
We are called to give proper exercise to "all [our] earthly activi-
ties ... [by gathering them] into one vital synthesis with religious
values."'2
LION THE GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE, at 143 (1976).1h Book Review, 67 INITIATIVES 4 (June 1995) (National Center for the Laity,
Chicago, Ill.) (quoting Rabbi Bernard Raskas, HUNGRY MIND REVIEW (Spring 1995));
see also Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes §§ 34, 67, reprinted in GREMILLION, supra note
121, at 243 [hereinafter Gaudium]; Laborem, supra note 11, § 25; KRONMAN, supra
note 4, at 370-71; SHAFFER, supra note 18, at 57-58.
12 JEFFREY K SALKIN, BEING GOD'S PARTNER 64, 95-96 (1994). Rabbi Salkin's
book is a practical guide to reuniting spirituality and work. As to law practice, see
id. at 98-102. Two of his chapter headings, "Shattering the Idols of the Workplace"
(chapter 7) and "Restoring Balance to Our Work Lives" (chapter 8), tell us what he
is after. It is a good primer for all working people who believe in God. Although it
does not explicitly adopt a virtue ethics approach, its thrust is the development of
the person as an imitator and coworker with God. For a discussion on the human
person as co-creator and partner with God, see JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC
MAN 101, 105, 107 (1983).
124 SALKIN, supra note 123, at 96 (emphasis omitted).
' John Paul II, Work and the Christian Conscience, 36 THE POPE SPEAKS 135,
136 (1991); see also John Paul II, Human Work, 29 THE POPE SPEAKS 225, 225
(1984) (discussing how man's work is a continuation of God's work). For testimonials
as to the intimate relation between spirituality and legal work in a wide variety of
faiths, see Faith and the Law Symposium, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 911 (1996).
'2 Gaudium, supra note 122, § 43.
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